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SUBJECT: SRSG ANGELO ON MINURCAT CURRENT AND FUTURE:  
MINURCAT I ABOUT TO DEPLOY TO CAMPS; CHAD PREPARED TO  
ENGAGE ACTIVELY WITH REINFORCED MINURCAT II

REF: (a) NDJAMENA 477, (b) NDJAMENA 461

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Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro, 1.4 (b/d).

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SUMMARY  
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¶1. (C) UN SRSG Angelo told Ambassador October 21 that MINURCAT I was up to 750 of its authorized 900 personnel; that it was about to deploy the first of 450 Chadian police and gendarmes it has trained along with their UNPOL mentors to refugee camps in eastern Chad; and that Chadian President Deby had substantially approved UN plans for a reinforced and expanded MINURCAT II to take over the EUFOR role in Chad after March 2009. The GOC was cooperating fully in current MINURCAT effort and planning for MINURCAT II. The GOC accepted some "re-hatting" of some EUFOR contingents in MINURCAT II but preferred a smaller military element (3,000 troops) than did the UNDPKO (6,000 troops) in MINURCAT II and were keen to add Formed Police Units to MINURCAT's toolbox, especially from African and Middle Eastern countries. Regarding the CAR, MINURCAT II should have some 500 UN military there, "perhaps an African battalion."

¶2. (C) The SRSG continues to impress with his strategic approach to problems, breadth of thinking, and diplomatic skills, especially his adept handling of relations with the generally suspicious and prickly GOC. Deployment of an expanded and reinforced MINURCAT II under SRSG's effective leadership offers one of the best hopes for progress in eastern Chad, not only in the area of security, but in relation to the broader civilian aspects of MINURCAT's mandate -- including human rights, prison reform, reform of the administration of justice, and other non-security sectors. The GOC also deserves more credit than it has gotten for its serious and purposeful engagement with both of the PKOs authorized by UNSCR 1778 in ¶2007. The GOC has consistently pursued a policy that contributed to the very rapid deployment of EUFOR in 2007-2008 and of the more deliberate, but increasingly effective deployment of MINURCAT I in 2008. SRSG Angelo evidently sees this GOC posture continuing and even improving in the future vis a vis MINURCAT II. THE UNSYG's October 17 report on UNAMID in Darfur points up just how differently the international community's key initiatives have been received on this side of the Chad/Sudan frontier than on the other.  
END SUMMARY.

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SRSG UPBEAT ON MINURCAT I AND II  
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13. (C) UN SRSG Victor Angelo told Ambassador October 21 that MINURCAT I was up to 750 of its authorized 900 personnel; that the UNPKO was ready to deploy the 450 Chadian police and gendarmes it has already trained to refugee camps in eastern Chad; and that Chadian President Deby had substantially approved UN plans for a reinforced and expanded MINURCAT II to take over the EUFOR role in Chad after March 2009. Angelo described Deby and the GOC as "very open" and "very engaged" on all MINURCAT-related issues. MINURCAT would begin sending the DIS personnel (the Chadian police and gendarmes it had trained to police the camps) to eastern Chad along with their UNPOL mentors (one UNPOL mentor per five-six DIS personnel). The GOC was cooperating fully in this effort.

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GOC OPEN AND ENGAGED ON ALL MINURCAT ISSUES  
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14. (C) SRSG Angelo emphasized that President Deby considered a post-EUFOR UN military presence in MINURCAT II "indispensable;" agreed that UN troops should escort, patrol, and protect refugees, IDPs, humanitarian workers, UNPOL and DIS personnel "actively;" agreed that UN military be mobile via air capabilities; that MINURCAT II would be politically "neutral;" accepted that the MINURCAT II military element should "react to attacks or direct threats" on camps and sites where humanitarians lived; and

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understood that MINURCAT II military were not there to defend Chadian territory against rebels. Angelo cited increasingly close collaboration between MINURCAT and the Chad military in eastern Chad as a promising sign. He highlighted that the GOC was firmly in favor of Formed Police Units being added to MINURCAT II's toolkit, especially gendarme units from African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian countries. The GOC would accept some "re-hatting" of some EUFOR contingents in MINURCAT II. He noted that Chad preferred a smaller military element (3,000 troops) than did the UNDPKO (6,000 troops) in MINURCAT II and that there were outstanding questions regarding DIS pay, intelligence gathering and sharing, among other things.

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THE SHAPE OF MINURCAT II  
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15. (C) Angelo said that MINURCAT II's position vis a vis the Chad rebellion would be clear. MINURCAT II will tell the rebels to stay clear of MINURCAT II assets and the camps and towns where humanitarians lodged, or suffer the consequences of UN military response, while reporting such contacts with rebels to the GOC. MINURCAT II will reiterate that rebel violence is "unacceptable and contrary to international law." Regarding CAR, MINURCAT II should have some 500 UN military there, in addition to whatever numbers were arrived at for Chad. He foresaw an African battalion presence in CAR. Angelo said that to relieve pressure on Abeche town, MINURCAT II would seek to develop a second logistical base at Goz Beida or Am Timan. Angelo speculated that the French might agree to provide logistical support to MINURCAT II, much as it had to EUFOR, but this was not yet agreed. EUFOR contingents that might offer a "re-hatting of troops" included Ireland, Poland, and

Finland. The Italians and Dutch were getting out. Norway was considering assuming the Italian medical role in MINURCAT II and the Libyans had agreed to contribute three personnel to MINURCAT II.

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CURRENT CHAD REBEL STRENGTH  
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¶6. (C) Angelo offered some impressions of current rebel strength. He said that there appeared to be some 3,000 rebels 25 kilometers from the big Chad border base of Adre, and another 1,200 near the border town of Modeina. No Chad rebels appeared to be inside Chad. Angelo said his military advisors believed that the Chad military were better prepared to repulse rebel attacks than they had been in February and June, and were conducting robust training exercises along the border.

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COMMENTS  
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¶7. (C) SRSG Angelo continues to impress us with his strategic approach to MINURCAT issues, his breadth of thinking, and his diplomatic skills, especially his adept handling of relations between MINURCAT and the generally suspicious and prickly GOC. We believe that the deployment of an expanded and reinforced MINURCAT II under SRSG's effective leadership offers one of the best hopes for progress in eastern Chad, not only in the area of security, but in relation to the civilian aspects of MINURCAT's mandate, including human rights, prison reform, reform of the administration of justice, and other non-security sectors.

¶8. (C) The GOC also deserves more credit than it generally has gotten over the past year for its serious and purposeful engagement with both of the PKOs authorized by UNSCR 1778 in 2007. The GOC has not exactly rolled over for EUFOR and MINURCAT II, but it has consistently pursued a policy that contributed to the very rapid deployment of EUFOR in 2007-2008 and of the more deliberate, but increasingly effective deployment of MINURCAT I in 2008. SRSG Angelo evidently sees this GOC posture continuing and even improving in the future vis a vis MINURCAT II. THE UNSYG's October 17 report on UNAMID in Darfur points

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up the vastly different kind of reception that the international community's key initiatives have received on this side of the Chad/Sudan frontier than on the other. END COMMENTS.

¶9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

NIGRO